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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONEIDENTIAL P67

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SUBJ: PRC UN DEL-DELIVERY OF NOTE ON TRAVEL REGULATIONS

REF: STATE 205625

1. ON EVENING NOV 11, US MISSION SECURITY OFFICER (WHO FOR SEVERAL YEARS HAS HANDLED USUN'S TRAVEL REGULATIONS PROGRAM) DELIVERED NOTE TO PROMISSION AT HOTEL ROOSEVELT DESCRIBING TRAVEL REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO MEMBERS OF PRODEL. UPON ARRIVING AT 14TH FLOOR MISOFF ENCOUNTERED KAO LIANG IN MAIN HALLWAY AND HANDED HIM NOTE. KAO SEEMED SUPPRISED AT RECEIVING COMMUNICATION FROM US MISSION AND INQUIRED WHETHER IT WAS FROM "MR. BUSH." HE WAS TOLD IT WAS. HE ASKED ABOUT CONTENT OF NOTE. MISOFF EXPLAINED THAT IT

HAD TO DO WITH
TRAVEL SEGULATIONS. KAO ASKED IF THEY WERE BEING RESTRICTED
TO THENTY-FIVE MILES. MISOFF REPLIED THAT THEY WERE NOT;
THAT THEY COULD TRAVEL ALL OVER US BUT IF THEY WENT BEYOND
THENTY-FIVE MILES OF NEW YORK CITY THEY WOULD HAVE TO
NOTIFY US MISSION FORTY-EIGHT HOURS IN ADVANCE. MISOFF
ADDED THAT THERE WERE SOME CLOSED AREAS WITHIN COUNTRY.
KAO ASKED IF" OTHER COUNTRIES" WERE SUBJECT TO

TRAVEL REGULATIONS. MISOFF SAID THEY WERE.

2. KAO THEN BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF DEMONSTRATORS. HE SAID SINCE MISCFF WAS "FROM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT" HE WANTED EXPRESS HIS OBJECTIONS TO PRESENCE OF DEMONSTRATORS ACROSS STREET FROM ENTRANCE TO ROOSEVELT HOTEL EARLIER IN DAY.

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Declassified/Released on 18/27/95
under provisions of 20. 18958

y J. Saunders, National Security Council

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
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
IKAO WAS REFERRING TO A SMALL TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE GROUP, NO MORE THAN FIFTEEN AT ANY GIVEN TIME, WHO HELD UP LONG BANNER FACING HOTEL. DEMONSTRATORS TOOK UP THEIR POSITION AT 3:00 PM, NOV 11, AND REMAINED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 5:00 PM. PICKETS DID NOT RETURN NOV 12.1 KAO TCOK LINE THAT USG WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENCE OF DEMONSTRATORS, SAYING THEY HOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE IF USG DID NOT APPROVE.MISOFF SAID THIS NOT TRUE, THAT USG WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY WAY AND THAT IN US PEOPLE ARE PERMITTED TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES FREELY. AS LONG AS THEY NOT DISORDERLY. KAO DISPEGARDED EXPLANATION AND SAID "IT IS VERY BAD. TAIWAN IS PART OF CHINA." HE REPEATED THIS STATMENT TWO OR THREE TIMES.

3. MISOFF, AFTER STATING THAT PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS TO DELIVER TRAVEL NOTE, EXCUSED SELF AND LEFT.

4. ENTIRE CONVERSATION LASTED LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES. GP-4. BUSH

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MEMORANDUM



November 26, 1971

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DIE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

My November 23 Meeting with Ambassador Huang Hua, Permanent PRC Representative to the UN

I met secretly with Ambassador Huang Hua, Peking's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, for two hours in New York on Tuesday night, November 23. He was accompanied by their Deputy Permanent Representative, Ch'en Ch'u, who is also the Director of the Information Department in the PRC Ministry of Forcign Affairs, and an interpreter. On our side were Ambassador Bush. General Haig, and Winston Lord.

The meeting served to establish this new channel for UN matters as agreed to by both governments through our regular channel, to make arrangements for future communication, and to begin discussions on such UN issues as South Asia, a new Secretary-General, and the Middle East. The Ambassador, whom I had met in Peking in July and has since been the PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, was affable but cautious. He generally cited his government's public statements as the approach they would take in New York. It was abundantly clear from Huang's performance that the PRC was surprised to gain admission to the UN this year, that it was not particularly enthusiastic about its entrance, and that its delegation is feeling its way in an unfamiliar environment.

Following are the highlights of the session, which took place in a small apartment on the East Side, hastily arranged by CIA.

The Private Channel and Public Performance

We confirmed our agreement with the Chinese that Huang Hua and I would secretly exchange views on "relevant major questions of principle within

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the scope of the work of the United Nations." We will communicate only on subjects of major importance, such as South Asia, at least until your visit, when various issues may become clearer. When consultations are necessary, we will decide on an ad hec basis how each issue should be handled between us, and establish understandings which could then be implemented by Ambassador Bush in New York. I pointed out that it was in our mutual interest that we don't appear to be cooperating visibly, and I made clear that we did not seek a great deal of contact.

After complimenting the Ambassador on how the PRC had turned aside requests from Democratic candidates to visit China, I emphasized the need for restraint in public statements between now and your visit. I said our side would avoid polemics, and pointed to their opening UN speech on November 15 as fodder for domestic opponents of your China policy. Many parties would like to derail your initiative; therefore while both sides would clearly stand by their convictions, we both had to be alert to this problem. I said that Vietnam was a particularly sensitive subject, a pointed reference to statements coming out of Peking during North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's current visit there.

South Asia

This took up the bulk of our time. I explained our approach both generally and in the United Nations; Ambassador Huang Hua referred to their public statements and reaffirmed PRC support for Pakistan.

I said that we knew what the Indians were up to, and I repeated our intention to cut off assistance if they clearly launched aggression. We were alleviating the suffering and economic dislocation of the refugees, having given more to this effort than the rest of the world put together; we had earmarked \$250 million for humanitarian relief in East Pakistan; and we favored a political solution of the problem and had taken many steps in this direction.

Reemphasizing that we would not accept military aggression by India. I outlined what we were currently doing to prevent hostilities, including our approaches to New Delhi, Moscow, and Islamabad, our consideration of UN action, and our approaches to the British and Germans.

Ambassador Huang Hua pointed to Chou's statements to me, their note in the other channel, their Foreign Minister's speech during Bhutto's visit in Peking, and their recent speech in the UN as representing Peking's basic position. This adds up to strong backing of Pakistan, including

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military assistance, but falls short of a commitment to send troops in the event of hostilities.

I outlined the type of resolution we were considering, and he said that they would have to study it. He inquired, and I confirmed, that we would probably not propose a Resolution but would work toward one that might have a restraining impact. He indicated the PRC's unenthusiastic resignation to the prospect of Security Council action, saying it was out of their hands. I pointed out that it was in our mutual interest not to appear to have positions too close on this issue, thus establishing the fact that we will have to be more evenlanded than they.

I assured him that we would not force the pace on this issue and would give them advance information on anything that we know would occur. My efforts to elicit more precise positions on their part were fruitless, as he clearly was restricting himself to their public statements and to assessing the situation as it evolves.

Ambassador Huang asked for our assessment of the military situation and I gave him the rundown of our latest intelligence estimates.

Successor to U Thant

I said that we would take into account their views on U Thant's successor, making it clear that I did not expect an answer at this time. He asked our views, and I said that we had not made any final judgment but had a slight leaving toward Jacobson at this point. The only candidate we had ruled out was Herrera.

He stated that they were unfamiliar with all the candidates and were still studying the situation. He pointed out that our official rejection of Herrera had put them in an awkward position when they were asked about his candidacy. I said that we would give them advance warning of any new official positions on the various candidates that we might take. He wondered whether there was anything to the suggestions that U Thant might stay on for a brief interim period while a successor was chosen: Amkassador Bush and I knocked down this possibility, saying that a decision was needed by January 1.

The Middle East

He raised this subject, asking in particular bow it might be treated in the United Nations. I briefly reconned the negotiating history -- the

bilaterals with the Soviet Union, the Four Power talks in the UN, and our recent intermediary role. Ambassador Bush and I pointed out that no serious discussion had really been held among the Four Powers. I mentioned in low key that we would not be opposed to their participation in this forum, and he emphasized that the PRC was not interested in joining these talks.

I said that we had hoped that negotiations would move away from discussions of theoretical formulations toward concrete progress, and I pointed out the difficulties which had arisen over an interim settlement which we had thought was important to show movement. Our immediate efforts in the UN debate would be to prevent exacerbation of feeling on both sides, as well as more rigid commitment by the Israelis to existing lines. I explained that making too absolute demands on Israel had the practical tendency of making it easier for it to dig in.

Taiwan Independence Demonstrations

I preempted this subject, knewing their sensitivities and the fact that there had been some recent demonstrations around their hotel. I reaffirmed that there was no US official involvement in these demonstrations. We could and would not interfere in demonstrations so long as they were legal and orderly. I pointed out that you had been the target of larger demonstrations than they. Ambassador Huang did not press the issue, but pointed out that there had been increasing Taiwan independence activities recently in the US and in other piaces, such as Japan. I repeated what I had told Chou En-lai, namely that we would not encourage or participate in such movements.

The meeting ended with agreement on future contacts and additional pleasantries. I repeated that we would do anything that we could to make their stay in New York more comfortable.